Book Review: Why Cities Lose
Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide is a book about political polarization between urban and rural areas by Jonathan A. Rodden, professor of political science at Stanford University and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. The book explains the history of the urban-rural divide from the 19th century to the present, primarily in the United States and Commonwealth countries.
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In the introduction, Rodden introduces the problem that occupies most of the book: the difference between vote share and seat share in legislative bodies for US Democrats. He compares this to proportional representation (hereafter PR, as in the book) in the multiparty democracies of continental Europe. He mentions some of the history that will be discussed in greater detail in the book proper. Rodden notes that gerrymandering is a smaller part of the story than most analysts believe, while urban-rural polarization is a much larger, intricate, and more important part.
Chapter 1 begins with the Reading Railroad strike of 1877, near the beginning of the labor movement in the United States that led to the formation of the Socialist Party. Rodden notes similar developments in other countries during the late 19th century and draws parallels between them throughout the book to show that urban-rural polarization is not uniquely American, although the rigid two-party system is. The distribution of manufacturing centers in 1880 and a map of Reading, Penn. are used to help explain political geography in terms of where the factory laborers who became unionized were living and working. Rodden explains how the Socialists were subsumed into the Democrats during the FDR presidency and compares this to what happened to similar parties in Europe and Australasia. He then discusses the adoption of PR in some countries and its lack of adoption in others, as well as the difference between presidential systems and parliamentary systems of government.
The second chapter goes into greater detail about the integration of the Socialists and other labor interests into the Democratic Party. The effects of this on urban-rural polarization and Democratic representation are analyzed here. Rodden begins by comparing the correlation between population density and Democratic support in Pennsylvania in every election from 1916 to 2016, showing the polarization not only develop in recent years, but reverse during the New Deal era. Next, he studies this more broadly, comparing the manufacturing core, the South, and other regions over the same century. The role of Southern segregation and the Civil Rights Movement in this polarization are discussed, but the impact of George Wallace’s third-party presidential bid in 1968 goes unmentioned despite being clearly visible in the graph. After explaining why manufacturing moved away from its earlier geographical arrangement, Rodden shows that the political geography of the Industrial Revolution lingers on today by correlating the 2016 election results with the geographical arrangement of manufacturing in 1920 and 2010, respectively, and finding stronger correlation in the former case. To bolster this argument, he shows a map of Reading’s rail systems and its 2016 precinct vote proportions for Hillary Clinton. Similar maps of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland are then shown for broader perspective. The history of changes in demographics and social organizations in the Rust Belt is covered so that the reader can see how railroad corridors remained Democratic strongholds long after the industries shut down. Rodden credits the role of family beliefs passed through generations as well, which is often overlooked. He concludes the chapter by broadening to the entire United States, finding that each region has its own pattern over time because other parts of the country developed differently from the Rust Belt.
The transformation of the two major parties in the United States into their current polarization from their relative lack thereof in the 1970s is the subject of the third chapter. Rodden notes that some form of urban-rural divide predates the Industrial Revolution, but this merits a chapter (or even a book) of its own rather than the page or so that it gets. He goes on to explain how the Democrats became the party of the knowledge economy even though libertarianism makes more sense for the technology sector. The social upheavals of the mid-20th century are discussed in terms of their role in American politics and politics elsewhere, with the two-party system explaining what would be odd policy packages in other countries. The effect of the knowledge economy on politics is shown by graphing the relationships between Democratic votes and college education, patent filings, and knowledge economy jobs, respectively. Rodden highlights the historical link between Democratic administrations and government funding for scientific research going back to FDR as well as the fact that Democrats were already firmly in charge of city governments where knowledge economy hubs developed to explain how technology companies became left-aligned. He then discusses how the social issue positions of the two major parties came to be what they are, though his explanations involve bottom-up social pressure, which will give pause to any student of Jouvenel. Rodden shows a graph of political opinion over time which shows a clear leftward shift over time, but does not examine why this has occurred. His next figure shows the ideological sorting of the parties on social and economic issues that occurred between 1980 and 1992, but fails to mention the strong third-party campaigns of John Anderson and Ross Perot in those respective years which should be expected to skew the results. The down-ballot impact of polarization is discussed in terms of adherence to party lines, which has understandably increased since the era of relative fluidity in the 1960s-70s. The rest of the chapter contrasts changes in American politics with those of Commonwealth countries during the same time period. Without segregation or a period of party fluidity, Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand are shown to have developed urban-rural polarization earlier, though none of them have had a consistently unified leftist party like the US Democrats. The structure of the parliamentary system is explained to provide cause for this difference.
In the fourth chapter, Rodden explores the political geography within cities. He explains the need for 19th century workers to live in close proximity to factories (and each other), with public transport originally used as a means for wealthier people to live away from the industrial heart of a city and form suburbs. He discusses the housing developments of the Industrial Revolution and their utilization since that time, now inhabited by immigrants, minorities, and the poor. The empirics used here are the correlations between distance from City Hall in Reading, Penn. and income, college education, ethnicity, and 2016 Republican vote share, respectively. Each graph shows clear urban, suburban, and rural zones with differing characteristics. Voting behavior is then shown for other Rust Belt cities, but it would have been more informative to show the other three correlations for them, which is only done for Philadelphia. Zooming out to the state level, Rodden illustrates the 2016 voting behavior for all of Ohio as measured from Cleveland City Hall. One is left to wonder if city halls are always built at the center of town, and how deviations in city planning might skew the results. Next, he compares knowledge economy cities to other post-industrial cities, with Phoenix being notable for its polycentric city plan. Zipf’s Law for city sizes within a larger region is used to explain why some states do not have a major city, and thus there is less concentration of leftists. Finally, Rodden broadens his considerations to Canada and Australia to show that partisan gradients in cities are not uniquely American, even if the gradients are somewhat different in other places.
Chapters 5–7 are concerned with gerrymandering and underrepresentation. Rodden begins with Pennsylvania, explaining how the distribution of voters greatly favors Republicans in state legislative races, then considers other factors that amplify that advantage, including gerrymandering and self-interest of Democrats in safe seats. He also notes that the federal Voting Rights Act and state laws that require city boundaries to be respected in redistricting prevent some maps that would be more advantageous for Democrats. Next, he discusses a simulation that he performed with two other political scientists in order to test whether gerrymandering had occurred. Another such method is then explained, which was used as evidence in a court case that resulted in the 2012 Republican-designed redistricting plan for Pennsylvania being overturned. To show how long this situation has been the case, Rodden compares Republican vote share to seat share in the Pennsylvania State Senate from 1938 to 2018. One again sees the era of relative fluidity in the 1970s. Rodden concludes that with current levels of polarization, Democrats need to moderate their message in order to overcome their geographical disadvantage.
The sixth chapter broadens the exploration of political geography and leftist disadvantage to the rest of the United States. Rodden notes that in deep red states, the centralization of leftists in urban areas allows Democrats to win seats where they otherwise would not. Other regional differences include the spread of minorities in the South and along the Mexican border, which allows for Democratic victories in rural areas. That said, he finds that nowhere are Republicans more concentrated that Democrats, suggesting that the urban-rural polarization is deeply entrenched and will not be eliminated anytime soon. With regard to gerrymandering, the findings are to be expected: those who have power will use it to advantage themselves, and laws will be subject to malicious compliance. The next sub-chapter is perhaps the most interesting of the entire book to the analytical reader, as it simulates vote share versus seat share for both evenly dispersed voters and voters concentrated as Democrats tend to be. The graphed difference between these curves is a picture worth many thousands of words. These curves are then used as tests of gerrymandering in state legislatures. Rodden finds that gerrymandering and geography have synergistic effects. The final topic of the chapter is efficiency, which is a measure of how many votes are surplus (giving a winner more votes than they need) or wasted (cast for losing candidates).
Chapter 7 extends the subject of the previous two chapters internationally. Rodden begins with England, where there are multiple leftist parties and no separate executive election. He then presents the distribution of ideology across US congressional districts to show the ideological battle that Democrats face internally. He considers the difference between a state’s federal House and Senate delegations as a function of the difference between the mean district and median district in that state. That the senators of a state are usually leftward of the House delegation should not come as a surprise, but Rodden neglects to compare these in the pre-17th Amendment era. Showing almost no difference between them at that time because the senators were then chosen by the state legislatures rather than by popular vote would bolster his argument. He only goes back to the 1940s, and again shows a period in the 1970s without strong polarization. In considering other Commonwealth countries, he notes that their leftist parties could not form an umbrella organization like the US Democratic Party, instead breaking into separate center-left and far-left parties which sometimes allowed right-wing parties to win. The example of Canada New Democrats and Liberals stands out here. The tendency of safe-seated urban politicians to look out for themselves instead of their parties is highlighted once more. Rodden explains the cycle that the far-left parties go through as they go too far left and can only come back in a wave election that is due to the failures of other parties through the examples of Britain’s “New Labour” and Australia’s “Labor Right.” Only here does he mention the US Supreme Court decision Baker v. Carr (1962), which should have been discussed much earlier. Rodden notes that the right does not generally have a significant split between center-right and far-right, but does not explain why.[Footnote 1]
The effects of PR are discussed in the eighth chapter. Continental Europe is the primary subject here, as Rodden contrasts what has been explored thus far with the relative lack of urban-rural polarization in the European Union. The urban left is shown to have advanced its policy agendas much further, but he neglects to mention that the generous welfare programs in Europe would be impossible without the United States taking care of military defense for those countries. Rodden is careful to point out that there are different types of PR, including some that mix PR with winner-take-all districts. He explains why PR reduces urban-rural polarization and produces multiparty systems, but can also allow extremists of any type to gain a foothold that would be denied them in a two-party system. Next, he presents empirics on rightist bias in legislatures versus cabinets for several countries. The lack of explanation for an enormous difference in Japan is a glaring omission. Rodden examines France and New Zealand more closely, as these countries have both used and not used PR in recent decades, providing a control that other countries do not have. He then considers why some countries have not adopted PR, with the consistent answer being the rational self-interest of those in power trying to suppress competitors. New Zealand is used as an example of how to overcome this.
The final chapter is a contemplation of future possibilities in the United States, and it unfortunately brings the Rothbard Rule to mind: that all final chapters of books should just be removed. The questions of whether Donald Trump is an aberration or the new Republican normal, and whether the Democrats will moderate or veer leftward are important but unimaginative. Though internal migration of Americans is discussed, the effects of demographic displacement and the resulting ethnic conflicts are not. He considers the possibility of a major American party breaking up or being displaced, but does not mention the one example of this actually happening: the Republicans supplanting the Whigs in the 1850s. Rodden suggests that elites will resist fundamental reforms to the current system that could allow for PR or other changes that open doors for third parties, but is again unaware of the Jouvenelian dynamic, recommending bottom-up pressure. It is odd to find no mention of an Article V convention, which is the constitutional remedy that is most likely to finally be attempted if polarization continues. Contra Rodden, federalism and decentralization are unlikely to succeed, and actually work against each other. A transition to imperial, non-democratic governance is off Rodden’s radar screen entirely, and the prospect of secession is not taken as seriously as it should be.
Overall, Why Cities Lose is a fascinating examination of urban-rural polarization that presents well-researched answers to several questions on which most political writers and pundits consistently err. However, the book can be repetitive on its primary points, and there is a disproportionate focus on the state of Pennsylvania in general and the city of Reading in particular. Rodden also seems to be unaware of heterodox theories and ideas that offer better explanations for certain political phenomena than established political science. Even so, there is more than enough good work here to justify reading this book.
Rating: 4/5
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Footnotes:
- The answer is that the far-right tends to reject the axioms of a democratic system, as reactionary monarchists would, and is frequently associated with demonized historical political movements, such as fascism and Nazism. They are therefore relegated to the fringe, if included in democratic government at all.
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