Introducing Agnostic History

Since the beginning of recorded history, a teleological element has been present in historical narratives. The precise form of this element has varied through places and times, but historians have always offered some sense of where we are going and what the future may hold. This is an understandable impulse; humans are the only extant species with the ability to conceive of the future in a meaningful way and make long-term plans beyond the horizon of gathering food for the winter. Making plans of worth requires having some idea of future conditions. In pre-modern times when social and technological progress occurred more slowly, past trends were generally a sound predictor of the future. But as knowledge has expanded and the pace of change has quickened, the fragility of the idea of a grand narrative of history has become increasingly obvious, as has the fallacy of assuming that past trends will continue uninterrupted. Let us consider each of the forms of historical teleology, then introduce and defend a non-teleological approach.

Decline and Cycle

The earliest narrative of history is that of the fall of man, of a decline from a previous golden age. In those times, there was no clear distinction between history and myth, so many such accounts are a combination of creation myths and a mytho-historical account of events between the creation and the present. Examples of this include the story of the Garden of Eden and man’s expulsion from it in the Abrahamic faiths[1], the Four Yugas in Hinduism[2], the Five Suns in the Aztec faith[3,4], and the five Ages of Man described by the Greek poet Hesiod[5]. In the Abrahamic and Greek traditions, man (or proto-man) once existed in a state of harmony, virtue, and free communion with the divine. The Hindu and Aztec traditions relate cycles of creation and destruction, ascent and decline. The Hindu cycles depict humans as becoming shorter in stature and lifespan as the Yugas progress.

It is easy to understand how belief in decline would become popular. The earliest written stories were transcriptions of oral traditions. The first civilizations to invent writing existed in the wake of a time of decline, which in turn followed a previous civilization that predated recorded history. In other cases, past forms of writing were lost to later inhabitants of a region. For example, Hesiod flourished sometime between 750–650 BC[6], just after the Greek Dark Ages (1100–800 BC)[7] which followed the Mycenaean civilization (1600–1100 BC)[8]. The present state of recovery just beginning, the recent memory of decline, legends of a better time in the past, and the loss of understanding of the Linear B script used by the Mycenaeans to record their affairs[9] make a historical narrative of fall from grace understandable.

In addition to the Hindu and Mesoamerican developments of cyclical views of mythology, the Chinese developed concepts of social cycles. The dynastic cycle in which a new ruler unites China, forms a dynasty, prosperity occurs, corruption ensues, a disaster occurs, civil war follows, the Mandate of Heaven is lost, a Warring States Period occurs, one faction wins the war to establish a new dynasty, and the Mandate of Heaven is gained by them has long been a prominent political theory in Chinese society.[10] Meanwhile, theologians of the Abrahamic faiths developed theodicies and eschatologies, some of which posited a telos of apocalypse followed by a Messianic age. Ibn Khaldun described cycles of nomads forming or conquering cities, states, and empires, then being displaced by other conquering nomads as their group cohesion (asabiyyah) faded over time.[11] Cyclical conceptions of history flourished during the Renaissance, such as Niccolo Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (1513–17). The most famous modern works in this tradition are Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918–22) and the Strauss-Howe generational theory.[12] Recent study in this direction uses mathematical modeling of long-term social cycles.[13]

Understanding the popularity of cyclical history is also straightforward. As record-keeping improved and people made more observations about the natural world, periodic and repetitive behaviors in all parts of life and nature were discovered. Despite our unique advances, humans are still a part of nature, so applying this pattern recognition to ourselves is a reasonable step.

The Hesiodic and cyclical views of history continue to inform conservative and reactionary political ideologies, to the extent that these seek a return to an idealized past rather than the correction of mistakes by bringing well-functioning elements of the past into the future. Religious fundamentalists also tend to view the world through such a lens, with a restoration to come in the future through divine intervention. Most modern philosophers of history, however, have come to adopt a different view.

The Whigs

During the Enlightenment, a view of history as linear and one-way became common. Paul Rapin de Thoyras’ 1723 history of England became the first major work of this type.[14] David Hume later supplanted him in popularity with his own history of England (1754–61). Later Whig writers included Charles James Fox, Lord Holland, William Blackstone, Henry Hallam, Thomas Babington Macaulay, and William Stubbs.[15,16,17] Whig historiography views the past as an inevitable march of progress toward greater knowledge and freedom, culminating in liberal democracy and constitutionally limited monarchy. The name comes from the British Whigs, who supported the power of Parliament over the power of the monarch, thus opposing the Tories, who did the opposite.[18] The historiography of science generally has a Whiggish character, dividing historical actors into those who laid the groundwork for current understanding of the world and those who ultimately hindered that progress.[19] Whig methodology is still used on occasion, in such works as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) and Michael Shermer’s The Moral Arc (2015).

In the 19th century, Karl Marx would appropriate this methodology and apply it to his own six stages of history: primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and anarcho-communism. His theory of historical materialism emphasizes the role of material conditions and interpersonal relations in determining the nature of society.[20,21,22] Like Whig historiography, Marxist historiography is generally deterministic, though its posited end state is a classless, stateless, property-less, egalitarian utopia.[23] As practiced in the Soviet Union, this methodology led to several distortions, such as predicting inevitable Communist victory[24] and viewing events having nothing to do with Marxism in terms of class struggle.[25]

Errors of Teleological Approaches

The idea of Whig history has acquired a pejorative use for several reasons. First, it is an example of the sharpshooter fallacy, in that a target of some desired end of history is painted onto the record of historical events. Rather than examining evidence and looking for a conclusion, as a proper academic should do, the Whig (or Marxist) historian has already decided the conclusion and alters the data to fit. Second, Whiggism is a form of historical determinism; it assumes, typically without sound logic or evidence, that events happened in a certain order and on a certain course because they had to, being pulled as they were in the direction of the Whig’s desired end. As Allan Greer writes of Whig views on Canadian reactionaries,

“They lost because they had to lose; they were not simply overwhelmed by superior force, they were justly chastised by the God of History.”[26]

This approach leaves them blind to alternate possibilities, as well as deviations from their own desired course. When history inevitably does progress past the endpoint for a particular Whig historian’s vision, the entire corpus must be reworked. As Schuster writes,

“Now, suppose some of our own knowledge might be subject to a revolution somewhere down the track. Then our Whig history, written before the revolution, will have to be recreated as a new Whig history in favour of the new revolution or theory. So Whig history makes history and the dynamics of historical change hostage to what we happen to believe right now, even though it is obvious that what is taken to be true and good might change radically later, thus changing the Whiggish pattern of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ in history.”[27]

Fear of this reworking leads Whigs to attack anyone who proposes that the end is further away, to say nothing of those who reject the idea of such an end.

Third, the presentism of the Whig approach leads its adherents to believe that current ideals were held in the past, which ends up producing a great amount of ignorant eisegesis when historical figures are examined in a context that they would find to be alien. It keeps one from investigating the real causes of historical change by providing the false answer that the cause was the march toward progress.[18] A fourth related problem is the historian’s fallacy, in which historical figures are assumed to have the same perspective and as much information as analysts in a later time period. This results in a form of chronological snobbery in which the present is viewed as superior because the past is judged on grounds that would be unrecognizable to the people living in it. Finally, just as the belief in decline comes from a limited perspective, so does a Whig narrative. The time scales involved are larger and the information available to the historian much more plentiful, but only by ignoring the great calamities that occur from time to time and are well-established by archaeology, paleontology, and cosmology can one sustain a narrative of inexorable progress.

That being said, the decline and cyclical narratives must not escape criticism. When those ideas were first proposed, their proponents did lack perspective and information, though through no fault of their own. As discussed previously, the particular circumstances in which many early historians found themselves tended to produce an erroneous belief in continuous decline. At this point, a historiography like Hesiod’s opposes too much evidence to be taken seriously; indeed a narrative of decline can only be supported by looking at a short time frame of a matter of centuries. While cyclical historiography makes the most sense as a grand narrative at present, even it assumes too much; namely, that history has a grand narrative at all.

A Non-Teleological Approach

Let us now contemplate the alternative of history without narrative, the idea that there is no moral arc of the universe bending toward anything in particular. A fitting term to introduce for this idea is agnostic history. The word “agnostic” was introduced in 1869 by English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley, who later wrote of it,

“Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle… the fundamental axiom of modern science… In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration… In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.”[28]

Though the word has since come to be used almost exclusively to refer to the belief that the existence of deities, the supernatural, and/or the immaterial is unknown or unknowable[29], we use the word in its more general sense here. Thus, agnostic history does not pretend that any historiographical narrative is certain.

With regard to the existence of deities, agnosticism has been further refined into strong, weak, and apathetic variants. Weak agnosticism (also called soft, temporal, open, or empirical) leaves open the possibility that the question may be resolved someday and withholds judgment until evidence becomes available. Strong agnosticism (also called hard, permanent, closed, or strict) makes the bolder claim that the existence of a deity is not just currently unknown, but is unknowable.[30] Apathetic agnosticism claims that no amount of debate can resolve the issue and any deities that may exist seem to be unconcerned about humanity, so the subject should be of little interest.[31] Agnostic history may also be qualified as such, though we will see that the strong position makes more sense and produces its own apathetic position in turn.

In order to be certain of the truth about which historical narrative, if any, is correct, one must have a complete data set. But as long as humanity, or post-humanity, or even the cosmos itself still exists, there is still history to record and knowing the entirety is impossible. As such, we and all of our descendants can never be sure that the historical data we have is a sufficient representative sample of the whole. Even if it were, it would only be true of this timeline and not necessarily of all those other timelines that could have been and that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics says there are at some unfathomable distance. Furthermore, any subject dependent upon empirical observations can never offer the sort of certainty claimed by a proponent of any narrative because a fundamental feature of scientific disciplines is that they are tentative, always subject to new evidence and better explanations. The case for choosing strong agnosticism over weak agnosticism is thus clear; when the evidence required to resolve the question is finally available, the point will be moot because the universe (or at least our time living in it) will be over. It is thus best to be apathetic toward any teleology of history, as its validity is unknown and will remain unknowable for all practical purposes.

In light of this reasoning, what then shall we make of historical teleology? Its raison d’être is twofold. First, it fulfills the human need to have meaning and purpose. Few people are content with not knowing where their society is going and what role is theirs to play. Historical narratives invent and impose such meaning where none may be found. Second, it aids the ruling elite by providing them and their vision with a sense of legitimacy. Survivors and victors have more narrative control, as the dead cannot tell their tales and the defeated are typically subjected to some degree of censorship and oppression, though this has been alleviated to some degree with the advent of archaeology and the spread of Enlightenment values. This control can be used in a Whiggish sense to portray their victory as inevitable and their opponents as losing to the very telos of history itself.

In closing, let us concisely state what the (strong) agnostic view of history entails:

  1. Agnostic history seeks an accurate record of past events.
  2. The primary purpose of learning history is to avoid repeating the same mistakes throughout the ages.
  3. The concern of the earliest historians for morally improving the student and providing good examples to follow is important, but the facts of history should not be altered for this purpose.
  4. The existence of a telos that directs human events toward any particular outcome is unknown and unknowable.
  5. Accordingly, the concept of the right side (or wrong side) of history is nonsensical. History simply is (or more appropriately, was).

References:

  1. Gen. 2:7-3:24
  2. Mark L. Prophet, Elizabeth Clare Prophet. The Path to Immortality. Summit University Press.
  3. Smith, Michael E. (2003). The Aztecs 2nd Ed. UK: Blackwell Publishing.
  4. Aguilar- Moreno, Manuel (2006). Handbook to life in the Aztec World. Los Angeles: California State University.
  5. Hesiod. Works and Days, lines 106–201.
  6. Hesiod. Theogony.
  7. Freeman, Charles (2014). Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 127.
  8. Fields, Nic; illustrated by Donato Spedaliere (2004). Mycenaean Citadels c. 1350–1200 BC (3rd ed.). Oxford: Osprey Publishing. p. 10–11.
  9. Ventris, Michael; Chadwick, John (1973). Documents in Mycenaean Greek (Second ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 60.
  10. Edwin O. Reischauer. “The Dynastic Cycle”, in John Meskill, The Pattern of Chinese History, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965). p. 31–33.
  11. Tibi, Bassam (1997). Arab nationalism. p. 139.
  12. Howe, Neil; Strauss, William (1991). Generations: The History of America’s Future, 1584 to 2069. New York: William Morrow & Company
  13. Turchin, Peter (2003). Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  14. Trevor-Roper, Hugh (1979). Lord Macaulay’s History of England. Penguin Classics. p. 10.
  15. Trevor-Roper, p. 12–26.
  16. Marwick, Arthur (1980). The Nature of History 2nd ed. p. 47.
  17. Soffer, Reba (1994). Discipline and Power: The University, History, and the Making of an English Elite. p. 87.
  18. Butterfield, Herbert (1965). The Whig Interpretation of History. New York: W. W. Norton. p. 12.
  19. Schuster, John A. (1995). The Scientific Revolution: Introduction to History and Philosophy of Science. p. 14–19.
  20. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto
  21. Marx and Engels, The Civil War in France
  22. Marx and Engels, The Critique of the Gotha Programme
  23. Fine, Ben; Saad-Filho, Alfredo; Boffo, Marco. The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing. p. 212.
  24. Satter, David (2001). Age of Delirium: The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Union. Yale University Press.
  25. Zalejko, Gwidon (1994); Jerzy Topolski (ed.). Soviet historiography as “normal science”, in Historiography Between Modernism and Postmodernism. Rodopi. p. 179–191.
  26. Greer, Allan. “1837-38: Rebellion reconsidered”. Canadian Historical Review (1995) 76#1:1–18, at p. 3.
  27. Schuster, p. 17.
  28. Huxley, T. H. (Feb. 1889). “II. Agnosticism”. In Christianity and Agnosticism: A controversy. New York, NY: The Humboldt Publishing Co.
  29. Rowe, William L. (1998). “Agnosticism”. In Edward Craig. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis.
  30. Le Poidevin, Robin (October 28, 2010). Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. p. 32ff.
  31. Rauch, Jonathan (May 2003). “Let It Be: Three Cheers for Apatheism”. The Atlantic Monthly.

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