In modern day America, precious little remains of a once strong decentralist tradition. Despite owing its existence to an act of secession, mere intermittent talk of secession in states like Texas, California, and Alaska has elicited little more than scorn and ridicule as a response. When left-liberals and Conservatism Inc. types don’t respond with laughter, they simply call Texans and Alaskans crazy for even mentioning secession. But could secession be half as crazy as the idea that the United States could continue in its current, highly-centralized form with 330 million people—many of whom share little in common—under mass democracy? In an interesting development, more people are beginning to reach this conclusion from very different starting points. Conservative George Mason University law professor, F.H. Buckley, is just one such person taking secession seriously. Buckley’s book, American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup, prompted Steve Sailer to write an article considering the possibility in Taki’s Magazine in March of 2020. [1] While Sailer’s article criticizes Buckley’s proposal of secession along party lines, the purpose of this article is neither to advocate for Buckley’s specific proposal nor defend it against Sailer’s critique. It is also not my purpose to predict the likelihood of any specific secessionist movement arising, although it is not too far-fetched to suppose, as Buckley does, that the right combination of events could lead to such a movement.
The significance of this idea even being raised should not be underestimated. Most secessionist movements have hitherto been limited to militias, libertarians, ethnonationalists, and other right-wingers generally outside of the mainstream conservative movement. And yet, it’s become increasingly clear that ordinary Trump supporters and Democrats alike are increasingly willing to consider just about any alternative to being governed by the other party. However, it is my contention that secession will eventually cease being a choice. While the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely due to the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism [2] and the loss of legitimacy that came from revelations of unprecedented terror and mass murder, the numerous nationalities—long suppressed under Communist totalitarianism—ultimately could not be replaced with a new Soviet man and much of the Soviet Union split along ethnic lines. Now, the bloated, highly-centralized, multicultural states of the West face the very same issues of multiple disparate ethnic groups and inevitable bankruptcy.
In Part one of this two part series on secession and decentralization, we’ll review both the deleterious effects of centralization as well as the benefits of decentralization. A crucial point is that the libertarian end of limiting—and ultimately stopping—the state’s expropriation of private property can only be accomplished with a decentralist approach. Additionally, we’ll also see that the nationalist end of restoring and preserving genuine nations will require secession. Indeed, our task is not simply to convince libertarians that secession would be beneficial for libertarian support alone will not be sufficient. Nor will it be sufficient for libertarians to continue viewing secession as one of several possible paths to liberty. Time is scarce and as such, it must be economized. What’s needed is for libertarians to agree that all practical political efforts should be directed towards secession and that traditional political solutions are a waste of time with little prospect of success. However, in order to understand why secession and decentralization present the only viable solution for libertarians, we must first identify the central problem with the state.
As Hans-Hermann Hoppe wrote, “every minimal government has the inherent tendency to become a maximal government. Once the principle of government—judicial monopoly and the power to tax—is incorrectly accepted as just, any notion of restraining government power and safeguarding individual liberty and property is illusory.” [3] Needless to say, as longtime constitutionalist Joe Sobran eventually concluded, ideas such as monarchism and limited government must be dismissed as fool’s errands. [4] However, if we understand why it is that states tend towards expansion, we can better evaluate which approaches can help property owners protect themselves against expropriation by the state, and which approaches are futile. Hoppe writes:
A state is a territorial monopolist of compulsion—an agency which may engage in continual, institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation—in the form of expropriation, taxation, and regulation—of private property owners. Assuming no more than self-interest on the part of government agents, all states (governments) can be expected to make use of this monopoly and thus exhibit a tendency toward increased exploitation. On the one hand, this means increased domestic exploitation (and internal taxation). On the other hand, and this aspect in particular will be of interest in the following, it means territorial expansionism. States will always try to enlarge their exploitation and tax base. In doing so, however, they will come into conflict with other, competing states. The competition between states qua territorial monopolists of compulsion is by its very nature an eliminative competition. That is, there can be only one monopolist of exploitation and taxation in any given area; thus, the competition between different states can be expected to promote a tendency toward increased political centralization and ultimately one single world state. A glance at Western history suffices to illustrate the validity of this conclusion. At the beginning of this millenium, for instance, Europe consisted of thousands of independent political units. Now, only several dozen such units remain. [5]
Constitutions do little to counter this tendency. Despite deep roots in natural rights and skepticism of government, the current constitutional system in the U.S. has proven to be a total failure. While this doesn’t prove that any constitutional system will fail, as Rothbard explained, the system’s reliance on the state’s own courts and judges makes it inconceivable that the beneficiaries of the regime will harm their own self-interest by limiting their own benefactor:
It is true that, in the United States, at least, we have a constitution that imposes strict limits on some powers of government. But, as we have discovered in the past century, no constitution can interpret or enforce itself; it must be interpreted by men. And if the ultimate power to interpret a constitution is given to the government’s own Supreme Court, then the inevitable tendency is for the Court to continue to place its imprimatur on ever-broader powers for its own government. Furthermore, the highly touted “checks and balances” and “separation of powers” in the American government are flimsy indeed, since in the final analysis all of these divisions are part of the same government and are governed by the same set of rulers. [6]
It should be clear, then, that the fundamental problems with the United States Constitution were not in the text of the document, but in the constitutional system itself. Thus, even if a “better” constitution were written without any of the specific clauses that resulted in the greatest expansions of state power and most infamous Supreme Court decisions, [7] the courts would find other clauses to exploit, or simply disregard the constitution altogether, as Abraham Lincoln did. [8] Indeed, Thomas Jefferson observed the three branches of the federal government were already cooperating to expand rather than check each other’s power as early as 1825. “It is but too evident, that the three ruling branches of [the Federal Government] are in combination to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers reserved by them, and to exercise themselves all functions foreign and domestic.” [9]
The state’s inherently expansionist tendencies and the assumption of self-interest also emphatically rule out the democratic solution of electing libertarians to repeal legislation. This idea is particularly insidious for not only does the democratic state rely on the same expropriation for its existence as any other state, but the democratic system raises the social degree of time-preference and thus, encourages increased expropriation at an accelerated rate. [10] As with the inevitable failure of constitutions, this conclusion can be supported by both theoretical insight and the historical experience of the democratic twentieth century, which saw unprecedented growth in the size and scope of governments everywhere. More specifically, we can point to the elections of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 and Republican majorities in the 1994 and 2010 Congressional elections—all on laissez-faire platforms. Yet the libertarian rhetoric quickly faded after election day and these Republican victories didn’t so much as put a speed bump in the way of the state’s continued expansion. Finally, as Jeff Deist concluced, “libertarianism will never be a mass —which is to say majority — political movement.” Therefore, we “make a fatal mistake when we dilute our message to seek approval from people who seemingly are hardwired to oppose us. And we waste precious time and energy. What’s important is not convincing those who fundamentally disagree with us, but the degree to which we can extract ourselves from their political control.” [11]
We have seen clearly why elections and constitutions must fail, but why should secession be any more successful? To be sure, there are also significant obstacles in the way of secession, but the problem of convincing a majority is not among them. [12] In contrast to democracy, secession is anti-majoritarian in that it involves a smaller number breaking away from a larger one. This means that secession rejects the idea that rights come from the state and should be subject to a vote. Moreover, unlike the reliance on the integrity of the state’s courts and judges, secession is a deliberate act on the part of the secessionists against the state that rules over them. Whereas the state naturally tends towards expansion and centralization leads us away from our goal of restoring private property rights, the act of secession is precisely the opposite and begins the path towards the ultimate libertarian end of private law and natural order. In other words, as Rothbard explained, once the principle of secession is granted, the logical conclusion is the libertarian end of independent neighborhoods, communities and eventually, individual households:
But more profoundly, would a laissez-fairist recognize the right of a region of a country to secede from that country? Is it legitimate for West Ruitania to secede from Ruritania? If not, why not? And if so, then how can there be a logical stopping-point to the secession? May not a small district secede, and then a city, and then a borough of that city, and then a block, and then finally a particular individual? Once admit any right of secession whatever, and there is no logical stopping-point short of the right of individual secession, which logically entails anarchism, since then individuals may secede and patronize their own defense agencies, and the State has crumbled. [13]
As we shall see, secession can also promote economic integration and prosperity. Ceteris paribus, centralization tends to promote economic stagnation and disintegration. This is so because as one state controls a larger area, it becomes more difficult for the citizens under its control to emigrate making it easier for a state to increase its expropriation of private property owners without all of its most productive citizens fleeing. [14] In contrast, in a world of smaller political units, the threat of emigration incentivizes less taxation and regulation and thus more capital accumulation, investment, technological advances and a higher standard of living. Granted, whether this is the case in a particular instance depends on whether the expansionist state has more or less liberal economic policies than the reduced or eliminated state. While it may seem counterintuitive, increased prosperity can accompany increased centralization for a time. That is, in the aforementioned eliminative competition, the states that typically win are the states with more economic resources at their disposal. Those states tend to be the ones that regulate the economy relatively less than their opponents allowing for a more rational allocation of resources and thus, more wealth for the state to expropriate through taxation. [15] However, this will ultimately prove to be temporary. As the more economically liberal states defeat their less liberal opponents, more territory comes under their control making emigration much more difficult for its subjects and removing the incentives to limit exploitation and expropriation of the population.
In contrast, secession and decentralization tend to promote economic progress and integration in the long run. For one, a state in control of comparatively more natural resources and territory is more capable of surviving with a policy of autarky whereas smaller states will be forced to allow more trade simply in order to survive. [16] Moreover, the increasingly centralized international order has substituted a system of freely fluctuating paper currencies with the U.S. dollar as reserve currency for the classical gold standard. [17] Just as we can reveal the impoverishment caused by protectionism by imagining a single protectionist household, the absurdity of the current monetary order is highlighted by imagining that each household issued its own paper currency. It should be apparent that the result would be a primitive system of barter. While disintegration of the monetary order has not proceeded that far, as opposed to a truly universal money like gold, this system of multiple currencies is a system of partial barter.
Money emerges when a commodity with proven marketability begins being used to overcome the need for a double-coincidence of wants and facilitate exchange. [18] Contrary to the basic purpose of money as a medium of exchange, multiple currencies make trade more difficult. Indeed, the very purpose of the introduction of paper money is never to facilitate exchange. Rather, its purpose is to fund the state’s expansion, both abroad and at home, while also enriching the state’s agents and collaborators. We need only look to American history to see this repeatedly demonstrated. The War Between the States, which led to the modern centralized American state, coincided with the Legal Tender Act of 1862, which empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to issue “greenbacks,” which were not immediately redeemable in gold, and the National Currency Acts of 1863 and 1864, which created a system of nationally chartered banks. Additionally, a 10 percent tax on state bank notes was imposed to secure a federal monopoly. [19] Similarly, FDR officially took America off the gold standard before establishing the modern welfare state and maneuvering the U.S. into the same Second World War that established the current international order. [20] Furthermore, because the dollar risks depreciation against the other currencies, a world banking cartel was established in the form of supranational organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This not only increased centralization at the expense of national sovereignty, but also allowed for coordinated inflation. [21] Thus, secession and decentralization would eventually require the restoration of sound money in the form of a universally accepted commodity like gold—which doesn’t bear the stamp of any specific government, but was instead established through centuries of free exchange—and the abandonment of the current system, which hinders, rather than facilitates exchange. [22]
While the legitimacy of secession was widely acknowledged in the United States until the 1860s, Ludwig von Mises also wrote strongly in favor of secession. Whenever people find themselves part of a political union they do not wish to belong to, Mises argued, the right of secession must be respected in order to ensure peace:
If a democratic republic finds that its existing boundaries, as shaped by the course of history before the transition to liberalism, no longer correspond to the political wishes of the people, they must be peacefully changed to conform to the results of a plebiscite expressing the people’s will. It must always be possible to shift the boundaries of the state if the will of the inhabitants of an area to attach themselves to a state other than the one to which they presently belong has made itself clearly known. … The right of self-determination in regard to the question of membership in a state thus means: whenever the inhabitants of a particular territory, whether it be a single village, a whole district, or a series of adjacent districts, make it known, by a freely conducted plebiscite, that they no longer wish to remain united to the state to which they belong at the time, but wish either to form an independent state or to attach themselves to some other state, their wishes are to be respected and complied with. This is the only feasible and effective way of preventing revolutions and civil and international wars. . . . . However, the right of self-determination of which we speak is not the right of self-determination of nations, but rather the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of every territory large enough to form an independent administrative unit. If it were in any way possible to grant this right of self-determination to every individual person, it would have to be done. This is impracticable only because of compelling technical considerations, which make it necessary that a region be governed as a single administrative unit and that the right of self-determination be restricted to the will of the majority of the inhabitants of areas large enough to count as territorial units in the administration of the country. [23]
In the present day, this doesn’t happen as frequently through the old form of imperial expansion and conquest. Rather, the state now uses immigration policy to expand its reach and power. Worse still, under democracy, perverse incentives prevent democratic leaders from discriminating in favor of quality. Instead, they tend to discriminate in favor of more welfare dependents. [24] Because the American voters were not enabling the state to expand rapidly enough, the state’s policy makers have taken the Brechtian approach of replacing Americans with people more receptive to a large welfare state. Peter Brimelow explains:
In 1953, there were riots in East Berlin against the Soviet-imposed Communist regime. These riots were extremely embarrassing to the East German Communists. They claimed their dictatorship was justified in the name of the working class. Now that same working class was taking to the barricades, in classic revolutionary style, to oppose them. According to left-wing playwright Bertolt Brecht, then recently returned to Berlin, the secretary of the Authors Union actually had leaflets distributed that said the people had forfeited the government’s confidence and could win it back only by working harder. This struck even Brecht as a little much. Hence the bitterness of his famous joke in the poem cited at the head of this chapter — why didn’t the government just dissolve the people and elect another one? For good or ill, the U.S. political elite seems to be taking Brecht’s suggestion seriously. As we have seen, the United States is now in the grip of an ethnic revolution. That grip is strengthening inexorably because of immigration. That immigration was caused by the 1965 Immigration Act. And that 1965 Immigration Act was the creation of politicians — some of whom are still in office. Just as Brecht suggested, the American nation as it had evolved by 1965 is being dissolved by public policy — by the U.S. Government. [25]
Prior to the Hart-Celler immigration act taking effect in 1967, nearly 89 percent of the immigrants who had come to the United States since 1820 had been of European descent. [26] This provided ethnic reinforcement for an America that was still almost 89 percent white in 1960—down slightly from just under 90 percent twenty years earlier. [27] By 1990, that number had fallen to less than 76 percent with some 85 percent of the 16.7 million legal immigrants coming from the Third World(47 percent from Latin America and the Caribbean; 34 percent from Asia) in the twenty-five years between 1968 and 1993. [28] Due to the seemingly inexorable replacement of the American population through immigration policy, non-Hispanic whites accounted for just 60.5 percent of the population in 2018 and were expected to fall below 50 percent of the population by 2045—a mere 80 years after the Hart-Celler act was passed. [29] Such rapid change is unprecedented and more and more Americans will find themselves part of a multicultural, multiracial political union they did not choose to be a part of. Thus, in order to avoid conflict and allow self-determination, these Americans must be allowed to opt out of a political system intent on replacing them and saddling them with ever-higher tax burdens.
Ultimately the current policy of mass immigration and denial of secession are both examples of the same problem: forced integration. [30] And as with other forms of forced integration, the result is conflict. Therefore, in addition to checking the inherent tendency towards conflicts abroad, secession also promotes domestic peace through freedom of association between private property owners. While forced integration between members of the same racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious group would still be a source of conflict, as Mises noted, ethnically homogeneous nations were the result when self-determination was allowed. [31] Rothbard’s observations were similar:
Every nation has enjoyed a homogeneous, and therefore successfully harmonious, cultural and ethno-national base. This does not mean, of course, that every single resident of say, Sweden, must be ethnically and culturally Swedish. But it does mean that beyond a certain tipping point, an infusion of heterogeneous elements into the Swedish mix will begin to tear the nation asunder. Beyond a small quantity, national heterogeneity simply does not work, the “nation” disintegrates into more than one nation, and the need for separation becomes acute. [32]
Indeed, the history of diverse, multicultural societies offers little reassurance. [33] In fact, Yugoslavia had been hailed as a model multi-ethnic society before its dramatic dissolution along ethnic lines a mere 73 years after its creation. [34] Given the fact that diversity decreases trust and social cohesion, [35] the current practice of Western states promoting diversity through mass immigration and forced integration must be considered especially alarming. Moreover, as Hoppe explains, this forced integration on a mass scale has had the effect of diluting distinct cultures and promoting cultural relativism:
Forced integration, as also illustrated by measures such as busing, rent controls, affirmative action, antidiscrimination laws and, as will be explained shortly, “free immigration,” invariably creates tension, hatred, and conflict. In contrast, voluntary separation leads to social harmony and peace. Under forced integration any mistake can be blamed on a “foreign” group or culture and all success claimed as one’s own; hence there is little reason for any culture to learn from another. Under a regime of “separate but equal,” one must face up to the reality not only of cultural diversity but in particular of visibly different ranks of cultural advancement. If a secessionist people wishes to improve or maintain its position vis-á-vis a competing one, nothing but discriminative learning will help. It must imitate, assimilate, and, if possible, improve upon the skills, traits, practices, and rules characteristic of more advanced societies, and it must avoid those characteristic of less advanced societies. Rather than promoting a downward leveling of cultures as under forced integration, secession stimulates a cooperative process of cultural selection and advancement. [36]
Similarly, Lew Rockwell pointed out that the “the very cultures that the incoming migrants are said to enrich us with could not have developed had they been constantly bombarded with waves of immigration by peoples of radically different cultures. So the multicultural argument doesn’t even make sense.” [37] The demographic trends look even more ominous when we consider that race relations between blacks and whites have yet to be solved. [38] In May of 2020, the demonstrably false narrative of police “racism” [39] sparked a series of riots that would ultimately kill dozens and cost billions in insurance claims and property damage. Of course, this original biracial mix in America was not the result of freedom of association either, and with constant inflammatory reminders of this fact, there appears to be little hope of race relations improving. As Brimelow predicted, its only a matter of time before these differences result in secession:
Even when the American population was more homogeneous, Americans had difficulty understanding one another. “Sectionalism” has always been a factor in politics, with for example the Midwest and the Eastern Seaboard disagreeing about isolationism in the 1930s. But it’s going to get harder. The experience of an Anglo-Cuban society like Greater Miami is going to have little in common with an Anglo-black society like Atlanta or even with an Anglo-Mexican society like San Antonio. These will be communities as different from one another as any in the civilized world. They will verge on being separate nations. And the existence of these different communities will raise the classic problem of federalism: why should any one of them submit in a larger political unit to the majority when it shares nothing with that majority? Particularly if the community is being visibly taxed for others’ benefit. All large political units will have difficulty containing these contradictions. This will begin locally (Staten Island trying to leave New York City), proceed to the state level (the northern counties trying to leave California) . . . and eventually could appear nationally (the Pacific Northwest going off with an independent British Columbia and Alberta?). [40]
Why indeed? It’s foolish to expect the situation to be resolved through Democratic means for the reasons we mentioned earlier. Immigration restrictionists have won major electoral victories such as the 2014 defeat of House Majority leader Eric Cantor and the 2016 Presidential election of Donald Trump only to see mass immigration continue unabated. And patriotic immigration reform will only become more difficult over time as demographics continue to change. However, if immigration were made a state issue again as it was until 1875, [41] it is reasonable to believe the situation would improve. In the first place, the state governments would be somewhat more responsive to people who actually have to associate with the immigrants. Moreover, if the immigration policy of a state were particularly unsatisfactory, this state would risk the emigration of its more productive citizens to other states. As with earlier examples, history also seems to support this conclusion. As Brimelow noted:
even European immigration was carefully monitored, for example to screen out potential paupers and threats to public health. Arguably, this scrutiny was actually stricter when immigration policy was the responsibility of the individual states, as it was until 1875. [42]
However, the problems extend far beyond racial and ethnic differences. Lest we forget the many Democrats reacting to news of Trump’s election with public displays reminiscent of North Koreans at Kim Jong Il’s funeral. On the other hand, ask Republicans if they’d like to risk being governed by Hillary Clinton. As Jeff Deist explained, there’s a much better solution for both parties:
One of the great ironies of our time is that both the political Left and Right complain bitterly about the other, but steadfastly refuse to consider, once again, the obvious solution staring us in the face. Now one might think progressives would champion the Tenth Amendment and states’ rights, because it would liberate them from the Neanderthal right wingers who stand in the way of their progressive utopia. Imagine California or Massachusetts having every progressive policy firmly in place, without any preemptive federal legislation or federal courts to get in their way, and without having to share federal tax revenues with the hated red states. Imagine an experiment where residents of the San Francisco bay area were free to live under a political and social regime of their liking, while residents of Salt Lake City were free to do the same. Surely both communities would be much happier with this commonsense arrangement than the current one, whereby both have to defer to Washington! But in fact progressives strongly oppose federalism and states’ rights, much less secession! The reason, of course, is that progressives believe they’re winning and they don’t intend for a minute to let anyone walk away from what they have planned for us. [43]
However, as Deist has noted more recently, the election of Trump was a rude awakening for progressives who found out that there were a lot more “deplorables” than they had previously counted on. [44] In light of this development, progressives would be well-advised to consider whether exercising some control over right-wingers is so important to them that they’d rather risk be governed by someone like Trump than have the opportunity to enact their entire progressive agenda.
With the benefits of secession established and the flaws in alternative approaches made clear, part two will focus on the keys to a successful decentralist strategy.
1 See Steve Sailer, “Secession Studies,” Takimag.com [March, 4, 2020].
2 For more on the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism see Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (Auburn, Ala: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1980).
3 See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 229-230
4 Joseph Sobran, “The Reluctant Anarchist,” Sobran’s [December 2002]: 3-6.
5 See Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 107.
6 See Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 48.
7 For a detailed summary of the clauses that were exploited to expand federal power see Thomas E. Woods Jr., Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century (Washington: Regnery, 2010), chap. 2.
8 For more on Abraham Lincoln’s abuse of power and disregard for the constitution, see Thomas J. DiLorenzo The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and Unnecessary War (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003); see also idem, Lincoln Unmasked: What You’re Not Supposed to Know About Dishonest Abe (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006).
9 See Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles, December 26, 1825, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. X, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899), 355.
10 For a detailed explanation of how democracy raises the social degree of time-preference and leads to a larger state, see Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001).
11 See Jeff Deist, “Secession Begins At Home,” Mises.org [January 30, 2015].
12 See Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 288-289: Hoppe reminds us that “neither the original American Revolution nor the American Constitution were the result of the will of the majority of the population. A third of the American colonists were actually Tories, and another third was occupied with daily routines and did not care either way. No more than a third of the colonists were actually committed to and supportive of the revolution, yet they carried the day. And as far as the Constitution is concerned, the overwhelming majority of the American public was opposed to its adoption, and its ratification represented more of a coup d’état by a tiny minority than the general will. All revolutions, whether good or bad, are started by minorities; and the secessionist route toward social revolution, which necessarily involves the breaking-away of a smaller number of people from a larger one, takes explicit cognizance of this important fact.”
13 See Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York University Press, 1998), p. 182.
14 See Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 114-115.
15 See idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), pp. 73-74; see also ibid., pp. 101-103; idem, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 109-110.
16 Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 116-117.
17 See ibid.
18 For more on how money is established see Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1971).
19 See DiLorenzo The Real Lincoln: a New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and Unnecessary War (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003), pp. 251-254
20 For more on this see Thomas E. Woods, Jr., “The Great Gold Robbery of 1933,” Mises.org [August 13, 2008].
21 For more on the destruction of the classical gold standard and establishment of the current cartelized monetary order see Rothbard, What has Government Done to Our Money? (San Rafael, Calif.: Libertarian Publishers, 1985); see also Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), pp. 107-115.
22 For more on the benefits of gold as money see Rothbard, The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar (Meriden, Conn.: Cobden Press, 1984); see also Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold (San Francisco: Cato Institute, 1983); for proposals to return to a classical gold standard see Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1971, chap. 23 and Robert P. Murphy, “Putting The Country Back on Gold,” Mises.org [July 28, 2011].
23 See Mises, Liberalism (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1985), pp. 108-110.
24 On the low skills of post-1965 immigrants as a result of the 1965 act and the propensity of immigrants to wind up on welfare see Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 141-151, 287-288; for more on immigration as a tool to expand state power see idem, “Immigration Is The Viagra Of The State”—A Libertarian Case Against Immigration, Vdare.com [June 4, 2008].
25 See idem, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 72-73.
26 See ibid, p. 281.
27 See ibid, p. 67.
28 See ibid, p. 77.
29 See William H. Frey, “The US will become ‘minority white’ in 2045, Census projects,” Brookings.edu [March 14, 2018].
30 For more on this see Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), chap. 7, “On Free Immigration and Forced Integration;” see also Rothbard, “Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation-State.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11, No. 1 (1994): 1–10.
31 See Mises, Liberalism (San Francisco: Cobden Press, 1985), p. 110: “So far as the right of self-determination was given effect at all, and wherever it would have been permitted to take effect, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it led or would have led to the formation of states composed of a single nationality (i.e., people speaking the same language) and to the dissolution of states composed of several nationalities, but only as a consequence of the free choice of those entitled to participate in the plebiscite. The formation of states comprising all the members of a national group was the result of the exercise of the right of self-determination, not its purpose.”
32 See Rothbard, “The Vital Importance of Separation,” Rothbard-Rockwell Report 5, no. 4 [April 1994]: 5.
33 For the results of multiracial and multiethnic societies see Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 124-127.
34 For more on the breakup of Yugoslavia see Tomislav Sunic, “Woodrow Wilson’s Defeat in Yugoslavia: The End of a Multicultural Utopia.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11, No. 1 (1994): 34–43.
35 See Jared Taylor, White Identity: Racial Consciousness in the 21st Century (New Century Books, 2011), pp. 126-127.
36 See Hoppe, Democracy—The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 113-114.
37 See Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., Against the Left: A Rothbardian Libertarianism (Auburn, Ala: Rockwell Communications, 2019), p. 109.
38 For more on race relations between blacks and whites see Jared Taylor, Paved With Good Intentions: The Failure of Race Relations in Contemporary America (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1993).
39 See idem, The Manufactured Crisis of Police Racism,” Amren.com [June 5, 2020].
40 See Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 69-72
41 See ibid, pp. xi-xii.
42 See ibid, pp. 16, 148.
43 See Jeff Deist, “Secession Begins At Home,” Mises.org [January 30, 2015].
44 See The Tom Woods Show, Ep. 1565 Decentralization and Secession: Jeff Deist on the Only Way Forward [January 8, 2020].
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